
Threat Analysis of Fake Virus Alerts

by Using Web Access Monitoring Mechanism for Android WebView Rintaro Orito, Koki Riho, Yuta Imamura, Masaya Sato, Toshihiro Yamauchi (Okayama University)


1. Introduction

- Mobile web browsers are vulnerable to fake virus alerts and phishing scams.
- ➤ When analyzing web access, the following challenges are face.
 - 1. Identifying Android apps for analysis.
 - 2. Monitoring encrypted HTTP requests and responses via WebView.




2. WebView Monitor

- > WebView Monitor was proposed to gather data and analyze web access via WebView.
- ➤ WebView Monitor sends and receives data of HTTP/1,HTTP/1.1, SPDY, and HTTP/2.
- > WebView Moniter has the following advantages.
 - (1) WebView Monitor can monitor web access via WebView.
 - (2) WebView Monitor can acquire the package name of the Android app.
 - (3) WebView Monitor can acquire HTTP messages encrypted by HTTPS as plain text. Information acquired by the WebView Monitor




3. Threat Analysis of Fake Virus Alert




Information used for displaying a fake virus alert

➤ WebView Monitor revealed a JavaScript code that acquires the user information.



Examples of fake virus alerts

- Fake virus alert attempts to make a user install a suspicious app.
- These fake virus alerts are generated using the acquired user information.



Redirection flow of a fake virus alert

- (1) Visiting the original website of redirection.
- (2) Tapping anywhere on the screen.
- (3) Redirecting to website 1.
- (4) Redirecting to website 2. This redirection uses JavaScript code "window.location.replace".
- (5) Redirecting to the website that displays the fake virus alert or other unwanted website.
- JavaScript code of Website 1 creates a URL with the specified URL and a randomly created string.
 - We suppose that this is a countermeasure against URL blacklists of security tools.

4. Conclusions

- > The WebView Monitor can be used to monitor web access of HTTP/1,HTTP/1.1, SPDY, and HTTP/2.
- > We showed that the overhead of the WebView Monitor is reasonable.
- In future work, we will consider countermeasures against fake virus alerts based on the results of this study. **Acknowledgement:** Part of this research result is obtained by contract research "WarpDrive" of research institute NICT(National Institute of Information and Communications Technology).